State v. White Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 42070 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-3-2014
State v. White Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42070
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. White Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42070" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5132.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5132
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 







MICHAEL DOUGLAS WHITE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ___________ ) 
NO. 42070 
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 201 0~ 
23858 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8210 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 





TABLE OF AUTHORITI ............................................................................................ ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the ................................................................................ 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............................................................................. .4 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 5 
I. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When 
It Denied Him The Right To Confront Witnesses And Lowered 
The State's Evidentiary Burden During The Probation 
Evidentiary Hearing ............................................................................................ 5 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................................................... 5 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When 
It Denied Him The Right To Confront Withnesses ........................................... 6 
D. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process 
When It Lowered The State's Evidentiary Burden During The 
Guilt Phase Of The Probation Revocation Hearing ........................................ 11 
II. The District Court's Finding, That Mr. White Violated The Terms Of 
His Probation, Is Clearly Erroneous .................................................................... 15 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 17 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 18 
Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 135 Idaho 208 App. 2000) 
·························· ............................................................................................. 13 
Figures v. State, 920 N. 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ........................................ 14 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) ...................................................... 6, 11 
Gawron v. Roberts, 113 Idaho 330 (Ct. App. 1987) ............................................ 1 O 
In re A. l/1/., 353 A.2d. 686 (D.C. 1976) ................................................................ 14 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) ........................................... 6, 7, 11, 14 
State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987) ................... ......... . ..................... 15 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137 (Ct. App. 1989) ................................................ 15 
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679 (Ct. App. 2010) .............................................. 13 
State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 (1989) ................................................................ 12, 16 
State v. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................................... 7, 8, 9 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679 (2004) .............................................................. 6, 15 
State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484 (2013) ................................................................... 13 
State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007) .......................................... 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15 
State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ................................ 14 
State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867 (2012) ....................................................... 6, 12 
Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804 (D.C. 2004) ............................................... 7 
Statutes 
I.C. § 20-222 ....................................................................................................... 15 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Douglas White timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. White argues that the district court's decision to use a 
magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that 
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his 
right to due process in two regards. First, he argues that the district court denied him 
the right to confront witnesses. Second, he argues that the district court denied him due 
process by lowering the State's evidentiary burden at the probation revocation l1earing. 
Mr. White also argues that the district court's finding that he violated the terms his 
probation was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on misdemeanor probation, Mr. White decided to drink at a bar. (R., p.10.) 
Mr. White was pulled over while driving home from the bar because he did not have a 
rear license plate on his vehicle. (R., p.10.) The police officer that pulled Mr. White 
over was informed by dispatch that Mr. White was on misdemeanor probation. 
(R., p.10.) The police officer noticed that Mr. White had bloodshot eyes and could smell 
the odor of alcohol emanating from Mr. White's vehicle. (R., p.10.) Mr. White failed 
some field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol 
(hereinafter, DUI). (R., pp.10-11.) 
Mr. White was charged, by information, with DUI and a felony charging 
enhancement based on two prior DUI convictions. (R., pp.43-44.) Pursuant to a plea 
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agreement, Mr. White pleaded guilty to felony DUI and, in return, the State agreed to 
make a favorable sentencing recommendation. (R., pp.46, 49.) Thereafter, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.61-64.) Upon review of Mr. White's period of retained jurisdiction 
(hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed him on 
probation. (R., pp.71-76.) 
While on probation, Mr. White was arrested for DUI and driving without 
privileges. (R., pp.102-103.) Due to that arrest, Mr. White was charged, in a separate 
criminal matter (hereinafter, New Case), with DUI, a felony charging enhancement, and 
driving without privileges. (R., pp.116-117.) A preliminary hearing was held on these 
new charges, and Mr. White was bound over on an enhanced felony DUI and driving 
without privileges. (R., pp.116-117.) 
Based on the charges in the New Case, the State also filed a report of probation 
violation, in this case, alleging that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.102-103.) Prior to the evidentiary hearing on the probation violations, the State 
moved the district court to take judicial notice of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination in the New Case. (R., pp.116-117.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the State argued that the only evidence needed to 
satisfy its burden of proof as to the alleged probation violations was the magistrate's 
probable cause determination from the preliminary hearing in the New Case. (Tr., p.3, 
Ls.15-24.) Mr. White objected to this procedure and argued that he had a due process 
right to a full revocation hearing, which required the State to elicit testimony from actual 
witnesses. (Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9.) Mr. White also argued that the only evidence proffered at 
the preliminary hearing in regard to the driving without privileges charge was the 
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arresting officer's citation. (Tr., p.4, Ls.11-15.) Mr. White then argued that he was 
denied the right to confront witnesses as to the alleged probation violations. 1 (Tr., p.5, 
L.15 - p.7, L.22.) 
The district court then ruled, pursuant to State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762 (2007), 
that there is a "markedly restricted" right to confront witnesses at a probation revocation 
hearing and denial of that right is constitutional as long as there is a "reliability 
determination" as to the evidence and a determination as to "whether the prior process 
has the earmarks of reliability." (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-23.) The district court then ruled, 
"based on the minutes of the February 21, 2014," preliminary hearing and the order 
binding Mr. White over to the district court, that the State had met its evidentiary burden 
as to the DUI probation violation. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-6.) However, the district court ruled 
that the State failed to meet its burden of proof as to driving without privileges allegation 
because the arresting officer's citation was the only evidence adduced at the preliminary 
hearing as to that charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.5.) 
After finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation, it revoked 
probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.121-123.) Mr. White timely appealed. 
(R., pp.126-127.) 
1 Mr. White's defense counsel initially appeared to be somewhat equivocal as to the 
assertion of a right to confront witnesses in regard to the alleged DUI probation violation 
because defense counsel recognized that Mr. White did have the ability to confront the 
State's witness at the preliminary hearing in the New Case. (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.7, L.5.) 
However, the district court asked a clarification question and defense counsel 
unequivocally asserted that Mr. White desired to exercise his right to confront witnesses 
as to the alleged DUI probation violation. (Tr., p.7, Ls.6-22.) 
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ISSUES 
1) the district court violate Mr. White's right to due when it denied him 
the to confront and lowered the 
probation evidentiary hearing? 





The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied Him The 
Right To Confront Witnesses And Lowered The State's Evidentiary Burden During The 
Probation Evidentiary Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Probationers have a due process right to basic procedures during probation 
revocation proceedings. One of those procedural rights is the ability to confront 
witnesses. However, this right is not absolute and can be denied in the event the State 
establishes good cause for its failure to produce witnesses. In order to establish good 
the district court and the must engage in a three-step process. First, the 
State must provide a good reason to justify its failure to produce witnesses. Second, 
the State must establish that the evidence which is being submitted in lieu of live 
testimony bears earmarks of reliability. The third and final step is the requirement that 
the district court weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against the 
probationer's right to confront witnesses. In this case, the district court erred because 
the State did not provide any justification for failing to produce witnesses, and, due to 
that error, the district court was not able to weigh the State's interest in failing to 
produce witnesses against Mr. White's right to confront witnesses. 
Mr. White also argues that his right to due process was violated because the 
district court's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination lowered the 
State's burden of proof at the probation revocation hearing. A preponderance of the 
evidence standard, which requires a higher level of proof than a probable cause 
determination, is used to determine whether a term of probation was violated. It follows 
that the district court's sole reliance on a magistrate's probable cause determination had 
5 
functional effect lowering the of the probation 
hearing from a preponderance of the a probable cause. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether a district court adhered to constitutional 
requirements during probation violation proceedings constitutes a question of law over 
which Idaho appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765 
(2007). Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence and are, therefore, clearly 
erroneous. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, {2004). 
C. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied 
Him The Right To Confront Witnesses 
The minimal due process protections which are required during parole and 
probation revocation proceedings were set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Morrissey, a case dealing 
with parolees,2 the United States Supreme Court held that revocation of parole entailed 
the loss of a liberty interest. Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 482. Since the loss of a liberty 
interest was at stake, the Court went on to hold that due process entitles parolees to 
some formal process before parole can be revoked. Id. at 485. The United State's 
Supreme Court then held that this process includes "the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for 
not allowing confrontation)." Id. at 489. 
2 Gagnon extended the holdings from Morrissey to probationers and, as such, the same 
conditions applicable to parole revocation proceedings are applicable to probation 
revocation proceedings. State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012). 
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The right to confront witnesses at a probation revocation hearing is not an 
absolute right and is not co-extensive with a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confront witnesses at a jury trial. Rose, 144 Idaho at 766-767. As such, 
probationer's have a limited due process right to confront witnesses which can be 
denied in the event the district court makes a "specific finding of good cause." Id. at 
768. Mr. White argues that the denial of his right to confront witnesses did not comport 
with due process because the State never provided any cause, let alone, good cause 
for its failure to produce witnesses, and, due to that error, the district court engaged in 
an erroneous good cause analysis. 
"In analyzing whether the defendant's right to confrontation was violated, courts 
employ a process of balancing the defendant's right to confrontation against the state's 
good cause for denying it." State v. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1998) In 
determining whether good cause exists, courts first look to the reason why the State has 
failed to produce witnesses, such as any difficulty and expense involved in procuring 
witnesses. Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court 
held that good cause could be found if the witness "would be subject to risk of harm if 
his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. In Young v. United States, 
863 A.2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004 ), good cause was found when a witnesses invoked the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. After the district court has found 
that the State provided a legitimate reason for failing to produce witnesses, the district 
court must then determine if the evidence which is being proffered in lieu of live 
testimony bears some indicia of reliability. Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807. Finally, the 
State's reason for not producing witnesses and the reliability of the substitute evidence 




in that case." 
conducted in order 
upheld on appeal. Id. at 807 n.4. 
131 Idaho at 807. This is a 
a trial court's cause 
inquiry 
to be 
In this case, the district court's good cause analysis was flawed because the 
State did not provide a reason why it failed to produce witnesses to testify at Mr. White's 
evidentiary hearing. At the beginning of that hearing, the district court asked the State if 
it was ready to call its first witness (Tr., p.3, Ls.13-14) and the State responded as 
follows: 
Your Honor, the State filed a motion that was signed March 13th, 2014, 
and I believe filed March 14th, requesting that the Court take judicial 
notice of Case CR-13-24814 wherein I understand Mr. White was subject 
to [a] preliminary hearing, and at that preliminary hearing probable cause 
was found on the circumstances which underlie the allegations in the 
relevant probation violation, so Your Honor, it's the State's intent to rely on 
that motion that the Court take judicial notice. 
(Tr., p.3, Ls.15-24.) 
Mr. White objected and asserted a "due process right to have an evidentiary 
hearing on a probation violation, and to take testimony, and to have this court decide 
those issues." (Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9.) After lodging those objections, the following dialogue 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Do you have any case law to support ... [the 
asserted right to confrontation]. 
MR. PHELPS:l3l There's Supreme Court case law that says that 
defendants have a right of confrontation in a probation violation hearing 
and the U.S. Supreme Court case law says you have minimal due process 
rights to confrontation in a probation violation hearing. 
3 Mr. Phelps represented Mr. White at the evidentiary hearing. 
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THE COURT: State v. Rose is what I've always gone by, and it 
says that it is very markedly restricted as long as there's a reliability 
determination that's been made and whether the prior process has the 
earmarks of reliability, and that cites to . . . Young v. United States. Is 
there any other authority that the defense has? 
MR. PHELPS: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I find that allegation one has been proven as it 
pertains to driving under the influence and that that was willful based on 
the minutes of the February 21st, 2014, hearing, the order holding or the 
bindover order that was signed that same day .... 
(Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.5.) 
The district court's reliability determination alone did not establish good cause to 
deny Mr. White the right to confront witnesses. The State failed to assert any reasons 
as to why it was particularly onerous to produce witnesses and, due to that failure, the 
district court did not make any factual findings as to the State's difficulty in producing 
witness. As mentioned above, the district court must evaluate why the State is not 
providing a witness before it determines whether the proffered evidence bears indicia of 
reliability. Farmer, 131 Idaho at 807. As mentioned above, courts have suggested that 
a risk of harm to the witness, the invocation of a testimonial privilege, significant 
expense, and other significant difficulty could be the basis for finding good cause. 
However, no such justification was provided in this case. 
Additionally, a review of the record on appeal leads to the conclusion that it 
would have been relatively easy for the State to provide a witness at Mr. White's 
probation evidentiary hearing. The witness at issue was a local police officer, Daniel 
Koontz, employed by the Spirit Lake police department. (See generally 02/21/14 Tr.)4 
4 This is a citation to the minutes of the February 21, 2014, preliminary hearing in the 
New Case. As mentioned above, the district court took judicial notice of these minutes 
at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.) However, the minutes of 
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Officer Koontz was available to provide testimony before the magistrate in the New 
Case approximately six few weeks prior to the probation evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.9, 
Ls.1-5; see generally 02/21/14 Tr.) There is no evidence that Officer Koontz had left the 
area or was otherwise unavailable to testify at Mr. White's probation evidentiary hearing. 
Since Officer Koontz testified at the preliminary hearing, there is no reason such as 
safety or the invocation of an evidentiary privilege, which would explain why he was 
unwilling to testify at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing. Mr. White cannot 
fathom any legitimate reason why a local police officer could not be made available to 
testify at Mr. White's probation revocation hearing. In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has held that, "Where, such as in this case, the state's principal witness is a local 
probation or police officer, it should pose no great burden upon the state to hold a 
Morrissey hearing .... " Gawron v. Roberts, 113 Idaho 330, 337 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Since the State failed to provide any reason why Officer Koontz was unavailable 
to testify, the district court was unable to make requisite factual findings as to that issue, 
which also prevented the district court from conducting the mandatory balancing of 
State's interest against Mr. White's right to confront witnesses. As the Idaho Supreme 
Court held in Rose, supra, this is a mandatory analysis which requires a specific finding 
of good cause tailored to the facts of each case. Rose, 144 Idaho at 768. 
In order to find good cause to deny a probationer the right to confront witnesses, 
the district court must find some reason justifying the State's failure to produce 
witnesses. The State's proffered reason must be legitimate, such as potential harm to a 
witness, the invocation of an evidentiary privilege, significant expense, or some other 
this hearing were not included in the record on appeal. Accordingly a motion to 
augment has been filed concurrently herewith. 
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difficulty in producing witnesses. 
court then determine whether the 
after finding been made 
evidence proffered by the State 
has earmarks of reliability. After the reliability determination has been made, the 
district court must then weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against 
the probationer's right to confront witnesses. In this case, the district court only 
determined that the State's alternative to live testimony was reliable. However, the 
State provided no reason why Officer Koontz was unavailable to testify at Mr. White's 
revocation hearing, and the district court made no factual findings indicating Officer 
Koontz was unavailable to testify. Due to that failure, the district court never engaged in 
the mandatory balancing of the State's interests versus Mr. White's right to confront 
witnesses. 
D. The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Lowered 
The State's Evidentiary Burden During The Guilt Phase Of The Probation 
Revocation Hearing 
The district court violated Mr. White's to due process when it lowered the State's 
burden from a preponderance standard to a probable cause standard. As mentioned in 
Section l(C), supra, the United State's Supreme Court has held that due process 
requires the adherence to formal procedures prior to the revocation of probation. See 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485; see also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. Accordingly, the 
Morrissey Court held that a parolee is entitled to two parole revocation hearings. Id. at 
485. The first hearing is in the nature of a preliminary hearing, which is conducted by a 
neutral officer charged with the determination of whether there is probable cause to 
believe the parolee violated a term of his/her parole agreement. Id. 
The second hearing is a final, more extensive, hearing wherein the court must 




for more than determining probable 
cause; it final evaluation of any contested and 
consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation." Id. at 488. In 
addition to the foregoing procedu the Morrissey Court held that the following 
conditions must be met at the final revocation hearing: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the 
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral 
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members 
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole. 
Id. at 489. 
At the final probation evidentiary hearing, the State has the burden to prove the 
existence of the alleged probation violation. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765. It follows that, the 
State must prove, under a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer violated 
the terms of his/her probation. See I.C. § 20-229B (providing that a preponderance of 
the evidence standard is applicable at parole revocation proceedings); see also State v. 
Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012) (holding that a probationer, like a parolee, is 
entitled to a preliminary and a final evidentiary hearing, under the same conditions 
applicable to the revocation of parole; thus, the State must provide the same process 
when terminating a probationer from probation as it does when revoking a parolee's 
parole). 
At a preliminary hearing, during the initial phases of a criminal action, the State 
must only prove that a crime was committed and that there is probable cause to believe 
the defendant committed the crime. State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 84 (1989). "The 
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probable-cause standard is less than a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Neal, 
155 Idaho 484, 487 (2013). A due process violation occurs when the State's evidentiary 
burden has been artificially lowered by its own actions or actions of the court. See 
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685-686 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. White argues that his right to due process was 
violated when the district court revoked his probation based on a different judge's 
determination made under a lower evidentiary standard than a preponderance of the 
evidence. Or in other words, the district court's procedure reduced the State's burden 
of proof from the higher preponderance of the evidence standard to the lesser probable 
cause standard. 
Support for Mr. White's argument can be found in Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for 
Pardons and Parole, 135 Idaho 208 (Ct. App. 2000). In that case, Brandt was on parole 
when he was arrested for committing a misdemeanor offense. Id. at 209. Brandt was 
then served with a "parole violation" for consuming alcohol and another "parole 
violation" for the new misdemeanor charge. Id. A probable cause hearing was held in 
the misdemeanor case and a magistrate found probable cause existed for the 
misdemeanor offense. Id. Brandt remained in jail because of the outstanding parole 
violations and, in the interim, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "alleging that 
his due process rights had been violated because he had not been given a hearing to 
determine whether there was probable cause to believe" he violated his parole. Id. The 
petition was denied because the court found that the "misdemeanor probable cause 
hearing satisfied Brandt's right to a hearing to determine the existence of probable 
cause for a parole violation warrant." Id. 
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Brandt appealed and argued that the foregoing procedure did not comport with 
the basic due process protections set for in Morrissey. Id. at 209-210. Specifically, 
Brandt argued "that the magistrate erred in holding that the probable cause hearing 
conducted on the misdemeanor charge was the equivalent of the preliminary 
prerevocation hearing described in Morrissey." Id. at 210. The Court of Appeals held 
that the magistrate erred because "the procedures for a probable cause determination 
in a misdemeanor case do not include the procedural safeguards mandated by 
Morrissey." Id. at 210-211.5 In distinguishing between the two hearings, the Court of 
Appeals explained that misdemeanor probable cause hearings are exparte and there is 
no right to confront witnesses. Id. In light of Brandt, the district court erred in this matter 
because it relied on the magistrate's probable cause determination when the standard 
at the final revocation hearing is a higher preponderance of the evidence standard. 
In sum, the district court's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause 
determination did not comport with the procedural safeguards set forth in Morrissey, 
because at the final revocation hearing there "must be the basis for more than 
determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested facts ... 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487-488. Therefore, the district court's ruling violated 
5 There are various jurisdictions which have held that the varying probable cause 
determinations which generally occur during the initial criminal proceedings cannot 
replace the final probation evidentiary hearing mandated by Morrissey. See, e.g., In re 
A. W., 353 A.2d. 686, 691-692 (D.C. 1976) ("[T]he finding of probable cause at the 
preliminary hearing with respect to the defendant's current charges does not constitute 
sufficient foundation, without more, for revocation of a defendant's probation."); 
Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 272-272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that evidence of 
an arrest and a finding of probable cause does not warrant the revocation of probation); 
State v. Scholberg, 393 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the 
revocation of probation was improper when the basis for revocation was the existence 
of allegations that the probationer committed a new offense and the mere fact the 
probationer waived a preliminary hearing). 
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Mr. White's due process rights because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from 
preponderance of the evidence to probable cause. 
II. 
The District Court's Finding, That Mr. White Violated The Terms Of His Probation, Is 
Clearly Erroneous 
In the event this Court determines that the district court's procedures at the 
probation revocation hearing did not violate Mr. White's due process rights, he argues, 
in the alternative, that the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his 
probation was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that finding. 
Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence and are, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 682. 
When a defendant appeals from an order revoking probation, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals employs the following analytical framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). "The finding of a probation 
violation must be on verified facts .... " Rose, 144 Idaho at 765. 
The State alleged that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation for driving 
without privileges and DUI. (R., pp.102-103.) At the evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that the State failed to establish that Mr. White was driving without 
privileges. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.5.) However, the district court found that Mr. White 
violated the terms of his probation by committing the offense of DUI. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5, 
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1 ) materials submitted by the in support of finding were 
minutes of preliminary hearing the order binding Mr. White over to 
district court. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-5.) Mr. White argued that there was nothing in the record to 
support a factual finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation because the 
State failed to "offer a transcript or any evidence for [the court] to evaluate 
independently." (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-10.) 
On appeal, Mr. White continues to assert that the minutes of the magistrate's 
preliminary hearing alone are not enough to independently establish the fact that 
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation. As mentioned in Section 1(0), supra, at a 
preliminary hearing, the State must only prove that a crime was committed and that 
there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime. Fain, 116 Idaho 
at 84. The specific term of probation Mr. White allegedly violated was the requirement 
that he "commit no violations of any law of ... of any state .... " (R., p.102.) Mr. White 
submits that a probable cause determination and minutes of the preliminary hearing are 
not evidence and are not enough to establish, under the preponderance of the 
evidence, that Mr. White did in fact commit a new offense. Absent a transcript of that 
hearing, there was nothing that the district court could evaluate to make the requisite 
factual findings that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation agreement. 
As such, the district court's factual findings that Mr. White violated the terms of 
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